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CONTRACT LAW
I. RIGHTS OF NEW HomE BUYERS CLARIFIED
In Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber and Manufacturing Co.1 the
South Carolina Supreme Court clarified the rights of new home buyers
in South Carolina. The court apparently intended its holding to be a
definitive statement on the rights of new home buyers. The Kennedy
opinion is important for several reasons. First, the court stated, "The
principles enunciated herein apply to all new residential construction,
regardless of whether the purchaser obtains and holds legal title, inter
alia: in his own name; in a corporate or partnership name; through a
limited partnership; or by means of a horizontal property regime."'2
Second, on the grounds that "this is the latest in a series of cases we
have decided concerning theories of liability in new, residential hous-
ing, ''3 the court used this case to reject the court of appeals' discussion
of the economic loss rule enunciated in Carolina Winds Owners' Asso-
ciation v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc..4 Finally, the court dramatically
reaffirmed the potential tort and warranty liability of South Carolina
builders, but declined to extend such liability to lenders who do no
more than lend money.
In 1976 Columbia Lumber and Manufacturing Company (Colum-
bia Lumber) sold building materials on credit to Charles Crumpton,
who did business as Rainbow Construction Company, to build a house
for speculation. After Crumpton essentially completed the house, he
experienced financial difficulties and was unable to pay his creditors,
which included Columbia Lumber. Consequently, Crumpton deeded
the property to his mother. Columbia Lumber filed a mechanic's lien
on the property for $3,392.62, the amount Crumpton owed to Columbia
Lumber. In lieu of foreclosing on the lien, however, Columbia Lumber
accepted title to the house and repaid the lot and construction
mortgages.5
On July 21, 1977, nine months after filing its lien and without re-
covering all of its losses from the original loan, Columbia Lumber sold
the property to the plaintiff, John Kennedy. In 1983 Kennedy noticed
1. 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
2. Id. at 337 n.1, 384 S.E.2d at 732 n.1.
3. Id. at 341, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
4. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988).
5. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 338, 384 S.E.2d at 732-33.
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a crack in the brick veneer on the rear of the house. Two years later, in
1985, he employed an engineer to estimate the cost to repair the crack.
The engineer reported that a defective foundation had caused the
crack. Thus, on September 27, 1985, Kennedy sued Columbia Lumber
for negligence and breach of warranty. Kennedy later dropped the neg-
ligence claim.6
The supreme court found that the facts of Kennedy placed the
case between the two earlier supreme court cases of Lane v. Trenholm
Building Co.7 and Roundtree Villas Association v. 4701 Kings Corp.8
In Lane the court held that a lender, who was also the subdivision
developer, was liable for the failure of a septic tank system under an
implied warranty of habitability. The developer had taken title to the
house from a builder who was in financial difficulty.9 In Roundtree Vil-
las Association the court held that a lender who monitored the work of
the builder was not liable in tort or under express or implied warran-
ties for defective construction. The court held that the lender's moni-
toring of the builder was insufficient to establish a legal duty to pre-
vent defects. The court also held that the lender was not a sufficient
party to the sales of the units to be liable under a theory of implied
warranty of habitability.10
Although the facts of Kennedy are similar to the facts in Lane, the
Kennedy court found that the facts brought the case within Roundtree
Villas, which rejected lender liability.1 ' In Lane the court emphasized
that "when a new building is sold there is an implied warranty of fit-
ness . . . which springs from the sale itself.' 2 In Kennedy Carolina
Lumber sold the house to Kennedy.' 3 In both Kennedy and Lane the
lenders acquired the homes from builders in financial difficulty, and
both lenders were trying to salvage their investments. Both lenders
chose to take possession of the house rather than foreclose on the lien.
Significant differences, however, exist between Kennedy and Lane.
The most important difference is that the lender in Lane also devel-
oped the subdivision. In Kennedy the lender merely provided building
materials to the builder. Second, in Lane the lender appears to have
completed the construction of the house, while in Kennedy "Columbia
Lumber did not participate in any way in the construction of the house
6. Id., 384 S.E.2d at 733.
7. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
8. 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
9. Lane, 267 S.C. at 500-03, 229 S.E.2d at 729-31.
10. Roundtree Villas Ass'n, 282 S.C. at 422-23, 321 S.E.2d at 50-51.
11. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 338-41, 384 S.E.2d at 733-34.
12. 267 S.C. at 500, 229 S.E.2d at 729 (emphasis added).
13. 299 S.C. at 338, 384 S.E.2d at 733.
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CONTRACT LAW
.. -14 Although the court did not mention it in the holding, a third
difference is the length of time between the plaintiff's purchase of the
house and his initiation of legal action. In Kennedy the plaintiff owned
the house eight years and two months before bringing Suit. 5 In Lane
the plaintiff only owned the house for one year and four months.'6
The Lane case, therefore, did not control the Kennedy decision
and the court modified its rule about the relationship between the sale
of a house and liability under an implied warranty of habitability. The
court held "that a mere lender, even if a party to the sale, is ordinarily
not liable under an implied warranty of habitability theory. '17 The
court does, however, describe six situations in which a lender could be
liable."'
The Kennedy opinion intentionally leaves open the question of
what constitutes a reasonable time within which a buyer can assert his
warranty claim.' 9 The case did not require the court to address Colum-.
bia Lumber's argument that a lapse of over eight years was
unreasonable.
The Kennedy court relied on the court of appeals' decision in Car-
olina Winds Owners' Association v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc.2° and
clarified and expanded the tort and warranty liability of residential
builders. In Carolina Winds Owners' Association owners of a condo-
minium building sued, among others, the general contractor and the
masonry subcontractor for construction deficiencies. Relying heavily on
the supreme court's opinions in Lane v. Trenholm Building Co. 2' and
Arvai v. Shaw2 2 the court of appeals held that (1) the defendant con-
tractors were not liable under an implied warranty of habitability the-
ory because they did not sell the building,23 and (2) the plaintiffs could
not recover in tort because of the economic loss rule.'
4
In Kennedy the supreme court rejected both of these holdings.
14. Id., 384 S.E.2d at 732.
15. See id., 384 S.E.2d at 733.
16. See 267 S.C. at 500, 229 S.E.2d at 729.
17. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 340, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
18. Id. at 340-41, 384 S.E.2d at 734 (lender liable if (1) it is also a developer, (2) it
makes express representations, (3) it knowingly conceals a defect, (4) it is highly involved
in the construction, (5) it cannot be distinguished from the developer, and (6) it fore-
closes on a developer during construction, takes title, is substantially involved in the
construction, and sells the home).
19. See id. at 339 n.2, 384 S.E.2d at 733 n.2.
20. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988).
21. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
22. 289 S.C., 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986).
23. Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n, 297 S.C. at 77-80, 374 S.E.2d at 899-901.
24. Id. at 82-89, 374 S.E.2d at 902-06.
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The court held that, based on its opinion in Hill v. Polar Pantries,25 an
implied warranty of workmanlike service exists and . .. is distinct
from the implied warranty of habitability.26 The court, however, ex-
panded the effect of this warranty of workmanlike service beyond the
effect of the warranty in Hill. In Hill the court based the implied war-
ranty on a contract theory and on a party's reliance on the other
party's "hold[ing] himself out as specially qualified to perform work of
a particular character. '27 In Kennedy the court broadly rejected any
privity requirement for the operation of this, and perhaps any, implied
warranty.28
The supreme court also rejected the applicability of the economic
loss rule in tort actions. The economic loss rule, which is traditionally
used to distinguish actions in tort from those in contract, states that
when purchased or repaired property is defective, no tort action exists
unless the defect causes damage to something other than the pur-
chased or repaired property. 29 Instead, the action is in contract.30 The
Keniedy opinion rejects this distinction because it focuses on conse-
quences rather than on action. The court noted that a future inconsis-
tency might exist. For example, a builder could be liable in tort be-
cause the buyer did not discover the negligence until the negligence
injured a person or other property, while an equally blameworthy
builder would not be liable in tort because the buyer discovered the
negligence before any injury occurred. 1
Under Kennedy actions apparently will lie in both tort and con-
tract for most construction deficiencies. The court stated, however,
that liability will be in contract if the only duty violated is contractual.
The court's example is a home buyer who contracts for a blue room
and the contractor paints the room brown.3 2 A failure to meet con-
struction industry standards and building codes is a violation of a legal
duty and, thus, is the basis for an action in tort.
The net effect of these, significant changes is not clear. The court,
however, has expanded home buyers' powers when purchasing residen-
tial property from builders. Furthermore, even more profound changes
can be expected if the warranty of workmanlike service is expanded to
cover other service contracts, and if the economic loss rule is inapplica-
25. 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951).
26. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 344-45, 384 S.E.2d at 736.
27. 219 S.C. at 271, 64 S.E.2d at 888.
28. See 299 S.C. at 344, 384 S.E.2d at 736.
29. Id. at 341, 384 S.E.2d at 734.
30. See id. at 345, 384 S.E.2d at 736.
31. Id., 384 S.E.2d at 737.
32. Id. at 347 n.3, 384 S.E.2d at 737 n.3.
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ble in both product liability actions and actions based on other types
of service contracts.
William R. Calhoun, Jr.
II. ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN A CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO A SUBCONTRACT
In Godwin v. Stanley Smith & Sons33 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals held that an arbitration provision in a construction contract
was incorporated by reference into a subcontract and, therefore, was
binding on the subcontractor.3 4 The court also held that the Federal
Arbitration Act superseded the South Carolina Arbitration Act, and
thus, the strict arbitration notice provisions of the South Carolina Ar-
bitration Act did not apply.35
Joey Godwir, a subconcontractor doing business as Godwin Build-
ers, entered into a contract with Stanley Smith & Sons (Smith) to hang
wallpaper in two motel buildings that were under construction.38 The
parties called the agreement a "subcontract" and referenced the con-
struction contract between Smith and the motel project's owner. The
subcontract between Smith and Godwin did not expressly require arbi-
tration, but the contract between Smith and the project owner con-
tained an arbitration clause. Godwin sued Smith for breach of con-
tract, breach of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, and
fraud. Thereafter, Smith moved to stay the proceedings and compel
arbitration.3 7 The trial court denied the motion and Smith appealed.3
8
Both state and federal policy favor arbitration. 9 Furthermore,
both the Federal Arbitration Act'0 and the South Carolina Uniform
Arbitration Act "1 contain specific requirements that parties must meet
before a contract is subject to arbitration. The Federal Act provides:
"If any suit or proceeding be brought. . . upon any issue referable to
arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the
court in which such suit is pending. . . shall on application of one of
the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been
33. 300 S.C. 90, 386 S.E.2d 464 (Ct. App. 1989).
34. Id. at 93, 386 S.E.2d at 466.
35. Id. at 95, 386 S.E.2d at 467.
36. Id. at 91, 386 S.E.2d at 465.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Trident Technical College v. Lucas & Stubbs, Ltd., 286 S.C. 98, 103-04, 333
S.E.2d 781, 784-85 (1985) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1060 (1986).
40. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to -240 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
1990]
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had .... " 2 The South Carolina Act, however, unlike the Federal Act,
contains a stringent notification requirement. The South Carolina act
provides that before an agreement can be subject to arbitration, "No-
tice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration . . . [and] shall be
typed in underlined capital letters, or rubber-stamped prominently, on
the first page of the contract and unless such notice is displayed
thereon the contract shall not be subject to arbitration."'
Although the South Carolina Act requires this notice, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that federal substantive law
supplants state arbitration law when the transaction affects interstate
commerce. 4 Moreover, South Carolina courts have held that, under
the federal act, parties can incorporate arbitration agreements by ref-
erence.'5 In fact, in First Baptist Church of TimmonsvilIe v. George A.
Creed & Son"6 the supreme court compelled arbitration between a con-
tractor and a church and stated: "We think that, in the absence of a
showing of fraud, mistake, unfair dealing or the like, a party to a con-
tract incorporating an arbitration provision cannot escape the obliga-
tion of such a provision by simply declaring: 'But I did not read the
whole agreement.' ",v
The contract between Godwin and Smith did not contain an ex-
press arbitration clause and the parties did not type or print a notice
that the contract was subject to arbitration on the first page of the
contract.48 The contract did, however, state that Godwin "agree[d] to
furnish all materials and perform all work. . . in accordance with the
General Conditions of the Contract between the Owner and the Con-
tractor . . . which General Conditions . . . hereby become a part of
this contract."49 The contract between Smith and the owner, however,
did contain an arbitration clause?' The court of appeals, in reversing
the trial court, stated, "It is well settled that, under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, an agreement to arbitrate may be validly incorporated into
a subcontract by reference to an arbitration provision in a general
42. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1989).
44. Trident Technical College, 286 S.C. at 104, 333 S.E.2d at 785.
45. See First Baptist Church of Timmonsville v. George A. Creed & Son, Inc., 276
S.C. 597, 599, 281 .S.E.2d 121, 122-23 (1981). But see Shaw v. East Coast Builders of
Columbia, Inc., 291 S.C. 482, 354 S.E.2d 392 (1987) (contract with a "General Condi-
tions" section containing an arbitration provision and also a contract addendum with a
"General Conditions" section without an arbitration provision was ambiguous and cre-
ated a litigable issue).
46. 276 S.C. 597, 281 S.E.2d 121 (1981).
47. Id. at 599, 281 S.E.2d at 123.
48. Godwin, 300 S.C. at 91-92, 386 S.E.2d at 465.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 92, 386 S.E.2d at 465.
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The court further held that the stringent notification requirements
of South Carolina Code section 15-48-10(a)52 did not apply because the
transaction between Godwin and Smith affected interstate commerce5 3
The Godwin court quoted the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion
in Episcopal Housing Corp. v. Federal Insurance Co.:54 "[U]nder the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause
2, this Court must recognize that federal statutes enacted pursuant to
the United States Constitution are the supreme law of the land."5
The Godwin decision demonstrates South Carolina's judicial pol-
icy favoring arbitration. Coupled with this policy is a willingness to
take a liberal approach in finding evidence of interstate commerce in
order to apply the federal act. Because most construction projects ob-
tain either material or labor from out of state suppliers, the contracts
usually affect interstate commerce. Thus, the state act will often apply
in construction cases.
The judicial arbitration preference policy apparently outweighs
the state legislative mandate that both parties to a contract be made
fully aware that the contract is subject to arbitration. Thus, the God-
win decision demonstrates the necessity of scrutinizing contract lan-
guage for any attempt to incorporate unattached documents.
Anthony L. Harbin
HI. REAL ESTATE BROKER NOT ENTITLED TO COMMISSION AFTER
TERMINATION OF AGENCY CONTRACT
In Webb v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Ander-
son 56 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that a real estate bro-
51. Id. at 93, 386 S.E.2d at 466 (quoting Maxum Found., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 7'19
F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1985)).
52. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
53. The court of appeals, in Circle S. Enters., Inc. v. Stanley Smith & Sons, 288
S.C. 428, 343 S.E.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1986), had previously quoted Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d
409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984), for the proposition that "the require-
ment of the [Federal] Act that a contract evidence a transaction involving commerce
must be broadly construed to promote arbitration." 288 S.C. at 430, 343 S.E.2d at 46.
The parties in this case did not dispute that the contract would affect interstate com-
merce. See Godwin v. Stanley Smith & Sons, 300 S.C. 90, 92, 386 S.E.2d 464, 465 (Ct.
App. 1989).
54. 269 S.C. 631, 239 S.E.2d 647 (1977).
55. Godwin, 300 S.C. at 95, 386 S.E.2d at 467 (quoting Episcopal Hous. Corp. v.
Federal Ins. Co., 269 S.C. 631, 239 S.E.2d 647 (1977)).
56. 299 S.C. 1, 382 S.E.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1989).
1990]
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ker, who claims a commission under an express contract or a contract
implied in fact, is entitled to compensation only if his efforts were the
procuring cause of the transaction, and he intervened during the con-
tinuance of the agency contract.5" Although the court found no South
Carolina Supreme Court authority to support the broker's claim based
upon a contract implied in law, the court of appeals did not rule out
the possibility of recovery in quantum meruit on different facts.5"
The dispute began when Burger King Corporation contacted
Webb, a real estate broker, to find the corporation a new location for a
restaurant in Anderson. Webb located a potentially suitable lot owned
by First Federal Savings and Loan. In 1984 First Federal offered to sell
the property to Burger King. Webb would be entitled to a commission
on the sale when Burger King accepted the offer. Burger King, how-
ever, refused First Federal's offer. Webb assured First Federal that he
would try to persuade Burger King to change its mind, and he contin-
ued to stay in touch with Burger King about the First Federal prop-
erty. In January 1985, Burger King asked Webb to contact First Fed-
eral about the availability of the lot. First Federal stated that the lot
was not available. Webb asked about the lot again in July 1985 after
Burger King inquired about its availability for purchase at a higher
price or for lease. First Federal rejected Burger King's overture.5" In
September 1985, however, First Federal began negotiations with a sep-
arate Burger King franchisee. First Federal and the franchisee reached
an agreement in December 1985 under which a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of First Federal would construct and lease a building to the
franchisee.6 0
Webb brought an action against First Federal seeking his commis-
sion on the Burger King lease. He sued First Federal for breach of a
contract implied in fact between Webb and First Federal and also sued
in quantum meruit. Webb won a jury verdict on these claims.6 The
trial court denied First Federal's motions for judgment notwithstand-
57. Id. at 6-7, 382 S.E.2d at 7.
58. See id. Quantum meruit means "as much as he deserves" and "describes the
extent of liability on a contract implied in law." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1119 (5th ed.
1979).
59. Webb, 299 S.C. at 3, 382 S.E.2d at 5.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2, 382 S.E.2d at 3. Webb's complaint alleged four causes of action: (1)
breach of an express contract for payment of real estate commissions; (2) a claim for
compensation based upon quantum meruit; (3) breach of a contract accompanied by a
fraudulent act; and (4) breach of a contract implied in fact between Webb and First
Federal. The trial court granted First Federal's motion for a directed verdict on the first
and third claims, but denied the motion on the claims for quantum meruit and breach of
a contract implied in fact. Record at 1-2.
[Vol. 42
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ing the verdict and a new trial.6 2 The court of appeals reversed.6 3
Under South Carolina law, to recover a commission on an express
or implied in fact contract, a broker must establish that a contract for
payment of a commission existed between himself and the principal at
the time the broker rendered the services.6 ' Because no express con-
tract existed between First Federal and Webb after Burger King's re-
jection of the offer in July 198465 the court of appeals also dismissed
the possibility of the existence of a contract implied in fact arising af-
ter this date. Before a contract implied in fact can arise,
[T]he principal must either do or say something tending to prove he
accepted the broker as his agent in the matter and the principal must
either know or have reason to believe that the services were rendered
on his behalf and to his benefit by the broker with the expectation of
receiving compensation from the principal.66
After reviewing the evidence, the court found that First Federal's
conduct was not sufficient to show that First Federal had agreed Webb
was to be its agent in the lease of the property.6 7 Webb neither intro-
duced the franchisee to First Federal, nor was he involved in any nego-
tiations pertaining to the lease. After Burger King's rejection of First
Federal's offer to sell, Webb's only substantial contacts with First Fed-
eral were made at the request of Burger King in its efforts to reopen
negotiations for a possible sales transaction between Burger King and
First Federal. 8 The court concluded that Webb's actions did not give
First Federal notice that he expected a commission on the lease.6 s
The court of appeals also denied recovery to Webb based on the
theory of a contract implied in law.70 The court held that a broker is
62. Webb, 299 S.C. at 2, 382 S.E.2d at 5.
63. Id.
64. Hilton Head Island Realty, Inc. v. Skull Creek Club, 287 S.C. 530, 536, 339
S.E.2d 890, 893 (Ct. App. 1986); see Note, Real Estate Brokers Contracts in South Caro-
lina, 18 S.C.L. REv. 819, 825 (1966).
65. Webb, 299 S.C. at 5, 382 S.E.2d at 6.
66. Hilton Head Island Realty, Inc., 287 S.C. at 536, 339 S.E.2d at 893.
67. Webb, 299 S.C. at 7, 382 S.E.2d at 7.
68. See id. at 3, 382 S.E.2d at 5.
69. Id. at 7, 382 S.E.2d at 7.
70. The court clarified the distinction between a contract implied in fact and a
contract implied in law (also commonly referred to as "quasi contract"):
Restitution is a remedy designed to prevent unjust enrichment. Historically
the form of action for this remedy was assumpsit, although no contract, ex-
press or implied, existed between the plaintiff and the defendant. Because of
this quirk of common law pleading, the term "contract implied in law" has
been used to describe the circumstances under which the law imposes an obli-
gation to make restitution for a benefit received, despite the absence of any
'agreement between the parties. The unfortunate use of "implied contract" to
1990]
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not entitled to commissions on the consummation of a sale or other
transaction of property occurring after termination of his agency con-
tract, even though the broker was responsible for the sale or for the
purchaser's interest in the property.7 1 The court held that First Fed-
eral did not owe Webb a commission on a contract implied in law and
concluded that a broker is entitled to a commission only for efforts
during the term of an express or implied in fact agency contract.7"
Although the court of appeals adopted the view held by most juris-
dictions when it refused to apply the theory of quantum meruit in
Webb,7 it is significant that the court expressly left open the possibil-
ity that the South Carolina Supreme Court might hold in a future case
that a broker is entitled to his commission by reason of a contract im-
plied in law.74
The supreme court's opinion in United Farm Agency v.
Malanuk"5 suggests that principles of quantum meruit may play a role
in broker commission cases. In Malanuk the broker was attempting to
locate a home for a client. He approached the owners of a home who
had placed a "For Sale by Owner" sign on their property and asked for
permission to show the home to his client. The owners gave a house
key to the broker and allowed him to show their house. The parties
made no agreement about a commission, and they did not sign a listing
agreement. The broker's client made an earnest money deposit on the
house, and the broker gave the owner notice of this deposit. A few days
later, the purchaser withdrew her offer, and the broker returned the
connote both true ("implied in fact") and quasi ("implied in law") contracts
has led to much confusion. The distinction, however, is clear. A contract "im-
plied in fact" arises when the assent of the parties is manifested by conduct,
not words. A quasi contract, or one implied in law, is no contract at all, but an
obligation created by the law in the absence of any agreement between the
parties.
Id. at 4, 382 S.E.2d at 6 (citations omitted) (quoting Stanley Smith & Sons v. Limestone
College, 283 S.C. 430, 434-35 n.1, 322 S.E.2d 474, 478 n.1 (Ct. App. 1984)).
71. Id. at 5-6, 382 S.E.2d at 6-7.
72. Id. at 7, 382 S.E.2d at 7.
73. See Hobbs v. Hudgens, 223 S.C. 88, 96, 74 S.E.2d 425, 427-428 (1953) ("[T]he
broker must not only show that his efforts were [the] procuring cause of the sale but
must further show that his intervention was during the continuance of an agency to sell
or to find a purchaser."); Hutson v. Stone, 119 S.C. 259, 263, 112 S.E. 39, 40 (1922) ("[A]
real estate broker is entitled to compensation, where the sale is effected during the con-
tinuance of the broker's agency. . . ."); Goldsmith v. Coxe, 80 S.C. 341, 346, 61 S.E. 555,
557 (1908) ("[T]he broker is entitled to his commissions, if, during the continuance of his
agency, he is the efficient or procuring cause of the sale . . ... "). See also Annotation,
Broker's Right to Commission on Sales Consummated after Termination of Employ-
ment, 27 A.L.R.2D 1348 (1953) (general discussion with case citations).
74. Webb, 299 S.C. at 7, 382 S.E.2d at 7.
75. 284 S.C. 382, 325 S.E.2d 544 (1985).
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earnest money deposit. The broker's client subsequently purchased the
house directly from the owner."'
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trial court's award
of a commission to the broker in Malanuk and stated, "A broker has
generally earned his commission when he acts during his agency as the
efficient or procuring cause of a sale, though the actual sales contract is
made by the owner without the broker's aid."7 7 The Malanuk court
stated that a "sales contract . . . entered into without the broker's
knowledge does not defeat the rights of the broker to a commission.
7 8
Although the court indicated that the parties established an agency
relationship in Malanuk, it did not indicate whether the parties had
terminated this agency relationship.
The purchaser's return of her earnest money arguably terminated
the agency relationship and suggests that the court may have awarded
the broker a commission on a contract implied in law rather than a
contract implied in fact. If this interpretation is accurate, then the su-
preme court has determined, notwithstanding the court of appeals
comments to the contrary in Webb,7 9 that a broker may recover in
quantum meruit even though the sale or other transaction is not con-
summated during the continuance of the broker's agency. Given this
perspective, a broker would only need to show that during his agency
he was the procuring cause of the transaction.
Even if quantum meruit recovery was available to brokers in ap-
propriate circumstances, the court in Webb found no facts giving rise
to a contract implied in law. Although similarities between Webb and
Malanuk exist, the facts in Webb differ significantly in one respect. In
Malanuk the broker had brought the property to the attention of the
ultimate purchaser. In Webb the broker played no part in the lease
negotiations between First Federal and the franchisee. This fact may
have been a significant factor in the supreme court's decision to award
the broker his commission.
The court of appeals' decision does not necessarily preclude recog-
nition of a contract implied in law in a slightly different fact situation.
If Burger King, rather than a franchisee, had been the ultimate lessee,
Webb would have had a stronger argument that his efforts ultimately
led to the lease arrangement between First Federal and Burger King.
Webb introduced the parties and took part in the sales negotiations
between them. Webb could argue that he had conferred a benefit upon
First Federal and that it, would be inequitable for First Federal to re-
76. Id. at 383-84, 325 S.E.2d at 545.
77. Id. at 384, 325 S.E.2d at 545.
78. Id.
79. See 299 S.C. at 7, 382 S.E.2d at 7.
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ceive this benefit without paying him for his efforts."0
Regardless of the interpretation given Malanuk, Webb indicates
that South Carolina has not yet closed the door to recovery in quan-
tum meruit by brokers under different circumstances in the future.
Robert H. Mozingo
IV. FOURTH CIRCUIT DENIES ACTION FOR BREACH OF A
DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT WHEN SUPPLIER DISCONTINUED LINE OF
INVENTORY
In Valtrol, Inc. v. General Connectors Corp.81 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an exclusive distributorship agreement did
not entitle the distributor to an action for breach of contract when the
supplier discontinued its line of inventory, despite a clause in the
agreement that required mutual consent for termination. 2 The court
also held that neither subsequent writings nor conduct of the parties
altered a conspicuous disclaimer of all implied warranties.83
The action arose out of an exclusive distributorship agreement be-
tween a national supplier, General Connectors Corporation (General
Connectors), and one of its distributors, Valtrol, Inc. (Valtrol). The
agreement stated each party's sales and promotion obligations and was
renewed each July 1. At Valtrol's request, a party had to obtain mutual
consent and ninety days notice to terminate the agreement. In May
1986 General Connectors notified Valtrol that it was terminating its
steam trap division on June 30. Valtrol received the last shipment of
steam traps in August. 4
Valtrol subsequently brought a diversity action for breach of con-
tract and breach of warranty and sought, among other things, damages
for lost profits and cost of coverage. The United States District Court
directed a verdict for General Connectors on the warranty claim and
80. This conclusion is reached by applying the elements of a contract implied in
law as outlined by the court in Webb. The elements are: (1) a benefit conferred upon the
defendant by the plaintiff; (2) realization of that benefit by the defendant; and (3) reten-
tion by defendant of the benefit under conditions that make it inequitable for him to
retain it without paying its value. Id. at 5, 382 S.E.2d at 6.
81. 884 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1989).
82. Id. at 152-54. The court noted that the substantive law of Texas governed the
contract. Id. at 151. Despite the court's application of Texas law to the breach of coh-
tract claim, the decision is independently reasoned and should influence other decisions
in the Fourth Circuit. See id. at 153-54.
83. Id. at 154-55. The court applied South Carolina law to the breach of warranty
claim. Id.
84. Id. at 150-51, 153.
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granted judgment non abstante veredicto (J.N.O.V.) for General Con-
nectors on the breach of contract claim after the jury awarded Valtrol
$215,000.21 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the J.N.O.V. because the mu-
tual consent termination provision presupposed both that "a viable
joint enterprise" would exist and that the parties would remain in the
market for steam traps.8 6 The court noted that a party's cessation of
business generally will not give rise to an action for the breach of a
distributorship contract because most distributorship contracts are ter-
minable at will by either party.8 7
Valtrol claimed that because the contract contained a mutual con-
sent requirement for termination, General Connectors should be liable
for the damages that resulted from an implied contractual duty to re-
main in business. The court disagreed, however, and compared the dis-
tributorship agreement to a requirements or output contract, which in-
cludes a duty for a company to use commercially reasonable efforts to
advance the joint enterprise rather than a duty to operate the business
in all circumstances.8 8 The court's decision that a mutual consent re-
quirement for the termination of the contract did not create an implied
duty to remain in business prevents one party from suffering perpetual
losses. The court also stated, however, that economic difficulties gener-
ally will not relieve parties of their contractual obligations. 9 Thus, the
court created a rule that protects both parties.
When it affirmed the directed verdict, the court described Valtrol's
purchase orders9" as an acceptance or a confirmation of General Con-
nectors' continuing offer to sell steam equipment. The terms of several
purchase orders, however, would have expanded the express limited
warranty. The court held that these were either different terms or ad-
ditional terms that materially altered the agreement.9 1 As a result, the
court held that under South Carolina Code sections 2-207(1) and 2-
207(2), these terms could not become part of the agreement.9 2 Finally,
the court held that section 2-207(3) did not apply because a written
85. Id. at 151-52.
86. Id. at 153. It is undisputed that General Connectors discontinued its steam
trap division because of consistent net operating losses.
87. Id.; see also Kenan, McKay & Spier v. Yorkville Cotton Oil Co., 260 F. 28 (4th
Cir. 1919) (output contract for sale of cotton not breached by mill's cessation of
business).
88. Valtrol, Inc., 884 F.2d at 153.
89. Id. at 153-54.
90. Several of the purchase orders included terms that purported to alter the lim-
ited warranty contained in the distributorship agreement. Id. at 154.
91. Id. at 155.
92. Choice of law provisions do not apply to implied warranty claims. The court
does not discuss why it applied South Carolina law to the implied warranty claims, and
the propriety of its application is assumed herein.
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contract existed.
9 3
Only three South Carolina cases have interpreted section 36-2-
207.01 The courts in two of the cases held that additional terms be-
tween merchants become part of the contract unless those terms mate-
rially altered the agreement.95 In the third case, T.E. Cuttino Con-
struction Co. v. Rigid Steel Structures"6 the Fourth Circuit held that,
even though subsequent forms contained additional terms that materi-
ally altered the contract, the new terms became part of the agreement
because both parties were aware of the trade custom in which parties
included such terms.97 The decision in Valtrol, therefore, is consistent
with existing South Carolina law.
The court's refusal to allow subsequent purchase orders to materi-
ally alter the limited warranty in the distributorship agreement is in-
consistent with its decision in Rigid Steel Structures, however, the de-
93. Valtrol, Inc., 884 F.2d at 155. The South Carolina Code, which adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code, provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confir-
mation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the addi-
tional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, to-
gether with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions
of this act.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-207 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
94. See T.E. Cuttino Constr. Co. v. Rigid Steel Structures, 869 F.2d 594 (4th Cir.
1989) (text available in WESTLAW No. 88-3913) (allows government specifications to
become part of a construction contract despite lack of agreement by the parties); Hin-
son-Barr, Inc. v. Pinckard, 292 S.C. 267, 356 S.E.2d 115 (1987) (agreement for sale of
restaurant equipment materially altered by invoice that substantially increased selling
price); Mace Indus., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Equip. Co., 288 S.C. 65, 339 S.E.2d 527 (Ct.
App. 1986) (buyer of water treatment equipment bound by seller's terms, however, addi-
tional terms contained in purchase order became part of contract only to extent terms
did not materially alter the proposed contract).
95. See Hinson-Barr, 292 S.C. at 269, 356 S.E.2d at 116; Paddock Pool Equip. Co.,
288 S.C. at 70, 339 S.E.2d at 530.
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cision aligns the Fourth Circuit with prior South Carolina law."
Moreover, because of Rigid Steel Structures,"9 material alterations by
additional or different terms will not become part of a prior contract in
South Carolina.
Finally, although the court's reasoning in Valtrol is sound,
whether the rule allows subsequent "subcontracts" by conduct that
materially alters the agreement is not clear, even though such altera-
tion is allowed under the code. Parties that recognize a contract by
their conduct, which is contrary to the written forms, could argue that
the Code's implied warranties of fitness and merchantability should
supplement the agreement, even if the original writings contain a dis-
claimer. The court's reasoning in Valtrol, however, seems to preclude
any subsequent alteration of a distributorship agreement absent the
explicit intent by the parties to make such an alteration.
Karl J. Forrest
V. "DiscovERY RULE" EXTENDED TO CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION
In Santee Portland Cement Co. v. Daniel International Corp.00
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applies
to the statute of limitations for contract actions under section 15-3-
530(1) of the South Carolina Code.'01 Under the discovery rule the
statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff knows or by the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of
action.' 01 Consequently, the three-year statute of limitations for "an
action upon a contract, obligation or liability, express or implied"10 3 is
98. See Hinson-Barr, 292 S.C. 267, 356 S.E.2d 115; Paddock Pool Equip. Co., 288
S.C. 65, 339 S.E.2d 527.
99. The court explained its decision as follows:
We ... agree that the additional terms in the subcontract materially altered
the offer. Nonetheless, we hold that Rigid accepted those terms as part of the
contract when it retained the deposit and began work on the project. We base
our conclusion on the particular facts of this case where, of great import is the
fact that Rigid and Mesco both knew that they were working under a govern-
mental contract that involved buildings required to be built in accordance with
government plans and specifications.
T.E. Cuttino Constr. Co. v. Rigid Steel Structures, 869 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1989) (text
available in WESTLAW No. 88-3913).
100. 299 S.C. 269, 384 S.E.2d 693 (1989).
101. Id. at 274, 384 S.E.2d at 696.
102. Dillon County School Dist. No. Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 286 S.C.
207, 215, 332 S.E.2d 555, 559 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 287 S.C. 234, 337 S.E.2d 697
(1985), cert. dismissed, 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E.2d 613 (1986).
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989).
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tolled until the plaintiff knows or should have known that the contract
has been breached by the defendant.
In April 1986 the Santee Portland Cement Company (Santee)
commenced an action against Daniel International Corporation
(Daniel) for breach of a May 1965 contract. The contract required
Daniel and its sub-contractors to construct a cement storage silo com-
plex that would consist of twelve circular concrete silos, six interstices,
and three pocket bins. Daniel completed the complex in 1966 and oper-
ated the complex for fourteen years with only minor problems.
104
During September 1980 one of the complex's three bins ruptured.
Two people were killed and extensive property damage resulted. San-
tee conducted an investigation which revealed that the complex's
twelve silos were structurally unsound and in need of repair." 5 Santee
filed an action in both tort and contract in April 1986.106 To avoid a
dismissal of the action because the statute of limitations had run,10 7
Santee urged the court to extend the discovery rule to contract actions.
The trial judge declined to apply the rule and granted Daniel's motion
for a directed verdict.108 On appeal the supreme court affirmed the case
in part,109 but reversed the trial court on the issue of the applicability
of the discovery rule to contract actions.110
The supreme court's adoption of the discovery rule in contract ac-
tions is a significant departure from prior South Carolina case law.
South Carolina courts historically have held that a cause of action for
breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach.111 In Livingston v.
104. Santee Portland Cement Co., 299 S.C. at 270, 384 S.E.2d at 693-94.
105. Id. at 270-71, 384 S.E.2d at 694.
106. The trial court granted summary judgment on the tort cause of action and
ruled that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was in contract. Id. at 271, 384 S.E.2d at 694.
107. At the time Santee filed this case, a six-year statute of limitation applied to
actions on a contract. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976). The statute has
since been amended to allow only three years to bring actions on contracts. Id. (Law. Co-
op. 1976 & Supp. 1989).
108. Santee Portland Cement Co., 299 S.C. at 271, 384 S.E.2d at 694. In making this
ruling, the court indicated that even under the discovery rule the statute of limitations
had run. The trial court held, as a matter of law, that by 1975 Santee had notice of the
defects in the project. Id. at 273, 384 S.E.2d at 695.
109. The court affirmed without comment the trial court's holding that Santee's ex-
clusive remedy was in contract. Id. at 271, 384 S.E.2d at 694.
110. Id. at 274, 384 S.E.2d at 696. The court also reversed the trial court's finding
that Santee's claim was time-barred as a matter of law, even if the court applied the
discovery rule. The court held that when Santee had or should have had notice of the
defects in the project was a question for the jury. Id.
111. See Executors of Sinclair v. Bank of S.C., 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 344, 345 (1847);
Sams v. Rhett, 27 S.C.L. (2 McMul.) 171, 183 (1842); Executors of Thomas v. Executors
of Ervin, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 22, 25 (1839).
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Sims.n" a leading South Carolina case on this issue, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that "[a]n action resting on breach of contract
generally accrues at the time the contract is broken, although substan-
tial damages from the breach are not sustained until afterward."' 13 The
Santee court, however, relied on recent South Carolina cases that favor
the discovery rule114 and overruled Livingston to the extent it was in-
consistent with the rule." 5
Although the legislature enacts statutes of limitations to protect
defendants from fraudulent claims by assuring them a chance to obtain
fresh evidence, the supreme court noted that "[t]his concern must be
balanced against a plaintiff's interest in prosecuting an action and pur-
suing his rights. Plaintiffs should not suffer where circumstances pre-
vent them from knowing they have been harmed.""' 6 The court also
suggested that statutes of limitations should not be applied mechani-
cally, but should be applied to achieve "the requirements of substan-
tial justice for all parties involved.""' 7
The supreme court also rebutted an argument based on the legis-
lature's possible intent in amending some, but not all, of the provisions
in the South Carolina Code dealing with limitations periods. Daniel
argued that "because the legislature enacted special discovery provi-
sions in sections 15-3-535 and 15-3-545 and did not act with reference
to any of the other sub-sections of section 15-3-530, we must assume
that the legislature decided against application of the discovery rule to
these sections.""" The majority admitted that the "inclusion of certain
provisions in a statute may be some evidence that the exclusion of
others was purposeful," ' 9 but countered that the legislature was
merely addressing issues raised by a case'20 the District Court of South
Carolina decided immediately prior to the legislature's amendments.' 2'
The majority then stated that "[t]here is nothing to indicate that the
legislature considered the applicability of the rule to other causes of
action.' 2 2 Indeed, the majority considered the amendments as legisla-
112. 197 S.C. 458, 15 S.E.2d 770 (1941).
113. Id. at 462, 15 S.E.2d at 772.
114. See, e.g., Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F.
Supp. 64, 78-79 (D.S.C. 1979), afld, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981); Mills v. Killian, 273
S.C. 66, 70, 254 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1979).
115. Santee Portland Cement Co., 299 S.C. at 273, 384 S.E.2d at 695.
116. Id. at 271, 384 S.E.2d at 694.
117. Id. at 272, 384 S.E.2d at 694 (quoting Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 33, 39
(D.S.C. 1976)).
118. Id. at 273, 384 S.E.2d at 695.
119. Id. (quoting Gattis, 413 F. Supp. at 37) (emphasis in original).
120. Gattis, 413 F. Supp. at 33.
121. Santee Portland Cement Co., 299 S.C. at 273, 384 S.E.2d at 695.
122. Id. The dissent was unimpressed with this line of reasoning and noted that the
1990]
17
Harbin et al.: Contract Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tive expansion of the discovery rule, comparable to similar judicial ex-
pansions by the court.
123
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision to apply the discov-
ery rule to the statute of limitations for contract actions is justified.
Any refusal to adopt the discovery rule would be contrary to prior
South Carolina court decisions124 that dealt with contract law but were
resolved on the basis of tort law.
Tracy Askew Meyers
changes made by the legislature affected causes of action "not arising on contract." Id.
at 275, 384 S.E.2d at 696 (Gregory, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). As to the
majority's reliance on Gattis, the dissent argued that "cases cited from the federal dis-
trict court are not controlling or even persuasive here." Id. The dissent also disagreed
with the majority's decision to overrule Livingston. Id.
123. Id. at 272, 384 S.E.2d at 694. For a discussion of judicial expansion of the rule,
see supra note 114 and accompanying text.
124. Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64,
78 (D.S.C. 1979); Dillon County School Dist. No. Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc.,
286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E.2d 555 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 287 S.C. 234, 337 S.E.2d 697
(1985), cert. dismissed, 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E.2d 613 (1986).
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